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We describe the evolution of selective aspects of punishment in the US over the period 1980-2004.
We note that imprisonment increased around 1980, a period that coincides with the “Reagan revolution”
in economic matters. We build an economic model where beliefs about economic opportunities and
beliefs about punishment are correlated. We present three pieces of evidence (across countries, within
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Several pieces of data suggest that contemporary policies concerning criminal 
punishment in America are harsh, both relative to other rich countries and relative to the 
country’s own history. For example, the incarceration rate in the United States in the 
early 1970s was around 100 per 100,000 of total population, whereas it is now over 700 
per 100,000. Figure 1 illustrates. It is also the highest in the world. In comparison, the 
average incarceration rate for European countries is somewhat over 100 (see, e.g., 
Walmsley 2007). Other aspects of America’s penal policy also appear harsh when 
compared with other countries at similar levels of development, such as the use of the 
death penalty.
1 An important question, and one we take up in this paper, concerns the 
causes of harsh punishment in America. 
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1 According to Amnesty International, in 2008, the United States was one of only eight countries with more 
than 500 prisoners on death row. With 3,263, it was second behind Pakistan. The other six countries 
included China, Thailand, Kenya, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Uganda. Many countries have designed 
reforms based on what they see as best practices in the United States 1`(see, e.g., the contributions in Di 
Tella, Edwards, and Schargrodsky 2010). ￿￿
￿
FIGURE 1 
Combined U.S. Incarceration Rate (Federal and State Jurisdiction) 
1925–2009 
 
SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics and University of Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics, 2003. 
The answer proposed in this paper is that beliefs concerning economic opportunities 
cause desired punishment levels in society. Although the explanation we present is 
relatively narrow, it is connected to the more ambitious notion that Americans punish 
criminals at this unprecedented scale because it is considered legitimate to do so. This 
stands in contrast to commonly discussed alternatives such as deterrence or the political 
economy of the “prison-industrial complex.” To emphasize (and at the risk of 
exaggerating), we are claiming that even if there was a well estimated deterrent effect of 
imprisonment widely accepted by criminologists, this would not explain the observed 
increase in U.S. imprisonment because somebody would need to produce evidence that 
voters agree that this is a good idea.
2 Part of the difficulty is to include explanations for 
policies that are in all likelihood counterproductive from a recidivism standpoint (such as 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
2 Experimental evidence by Carlsmith et al. (2002) suggests that individuals are motivated by retribution 
concerns (over deterrence) when choosing punishment. They study individuals who are given a short 
vignette describing a theft and are asked for a sentence recommendation. They show that when the 
probability of catching the thief in the vignette changes, the sentencing recommendation does not change, 
contrary to what deterrence suggests. On the other hand, sentences were harsher when the thief’s 
motivation changes (in one case he wanted money to redistribute to the poor and in another he needed it for 
cancelling betting debts). ￿￿
￿
charging inmates telephone rates that are significantly higher than those for the general 
population; see, e.g., Dannenberg 2011). And, of course, it would be hard to write down a 
deterrence model that fits the magnitude of the incarceration changes without dramatic 
(and implausible) changes in the other variables of the model.
3 A similar difficulty affects 
many explanations based on the political economy of the prison-industrial complex. If the 
expansion is driven by corruption or lobbying by interest groups, why do so many 
Americans support these policies? To qualify as an answer to the question of why such 
harsh punishment in America, we think, there has to be an explanation for why so many 
Americans are happy to support harshness levels that in other countries would be 
considered completely out of all proportion.  
We organize our paper around a model and several pieces of evidence that are 
consistent with this hypothesis. In the model, we focus on agents that differ in the 
expected rewards for work and hence in their preferred economic system (as in Piketty 
1995). Differences in the power of incentive schemes used (or in tax rates) induce further 
differences in effort and, a posteriori, differences in the propensity to commit crime. 
Inferences about the characteristics of criminals (for example, those formed by judges) 
differ across economic systems. This provides an economic explanation for why some 
ideological beliefs go together. Specifically, we show that people whose values and 
beliefs simultaneously include the harsh treatment of criminals and the virtues of free 
markets (and support low taxes) hold a coherent model of how the world works. Put 
differently, criminals are “meaner” in systems where there are more economic 
opportunities, so the belief that there are more economic opportunities (for example, in 
America relative to Europe, or within the United States after 1980 and the Reagan 
presidency) is the driver of the demand for harsh punishment.
4 Our explanation is thus 
connected to work on the expressive content of the law, where policymakers “send a 
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3 For example, it would require a large increase in the income of the lowest decile (the legal alternative for 
many criminals) in the United States relative to France. 
4 Merton (1938) argued that high crime rates in America were a result of the psychological stress created by 
the gap between a reality of limited opportunities and a generalized belief in the “American dream.” See 
also￿Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) and Cullen and Agnew (2003). They do not explain, however, why 
such harsh punishment might be associated with these beliefs, particularly if such mitigating circumstances 
are present. Closer in spirit to our approach is the fascinating comparative historical study by Whitman 
(2003). He argues that American rejection of status-oriented European societies based on a strong state led 
to the adoption of egalitarian harsh punishment.  ￿￿
￿
message” about society’s values by setting harsh sentences (see Sunstein 1996 and 
Benabou and Tirole 2011). 
We provide different pieces of evidence that are consistent with the idea that 
economic beliefs cause punishment. First, we compare the United States to other 
countries and show that the desire to punish criminals and certain economic beliefs (such 
as that effort, rather than luck, matters in the determination of income) are relatively more 
widespread in the United States. We also note that there is a positive correlation between 
these two variables in a small cross section of countries. This section reveals two key 
limitations of our paper. The first is causality: obviously this correlation does not 
establish a causal link, and even if it did (later in the paper we have some causal 
evidence), it does not show that the link originates in the particular mechanisms outlined 
in our model. The second is measurement error: any study dealing with people’s beliefs 
and with punitiveness (either people’s desire to punish or as expressed in the 
classifications of the legal system) has to deal with imprecise measures, particularly when 
it involves people living in different time periods or geographical jurisdictions. This 
makes it difficult to design convincing tests to distinguish between alternative 
hypotheses.  
Our second piece of evidence reveals that, within the United States, beliefs about the 
economic system have moved toward the right end of the ideological spectrum over time, 
particularly for African Americans. We also show that the proportion of people who 
support the death penalty and the average belief in “effort pays” are positively correlated 
across U.S. states. The data also show that there is a correlation between beliefs and 
punitiveness at the individual level: people who believe effort pays also support the death 
penalty.  
Finally, we conduct an experiment to provide at least suggestive evidence on one 
aspect of the causal link between beliefs and punitiveness. Students are randomly 
exposed to hypothetical situations involving criminals from neighborhoods with different 
economic opportunities. Students who were exposed to a criminal who grew up in a 
neighborhood with good educational prospects that were associated with economic 
progress supported tougher punishment (for the same crime) than those exposed to a ￿￿
￿
criminal who did not have those opportunities. Although the causal link we develop in 
the model is more complex and there is obviously a question of the external validity of 
this empirical exercise, the evidence suggests that beliefs in economic opportunities cause 
punitiveness. 
Our paper is related to a large literature on the structure of ideology. Several authors 
have studied the nature of political beliefs, many of them observing the fact that 
ideological beliefs often come in bundles (see, e.g., de Tocqueville 1955, Lipset 1979, 
inter alia; see also the discussions in Rokeach 1973, Feldman 1988, Inglehart 1990, and 
Zaller 1991).
5 Two important questions are why beliefs about one issue differ across 
people within the same society who presumably observe the same reality, and why beliefs 
about different processes (e.g., whether firms pollute too much and whether effort pays) 
are often correlated. One interesting approach puts emphasis on explaining the structure 
of beliefs as a coherent outcome when individuals organize information using metaphors 
(see, e.g., Lakoff 1996). An alternative approach is taken by psychologists who study 
belief bundling as originating in personality traits and goes back to the work on fascism 
and authoritarian personality by Adorno et al. (1950). Views about motivated social 
cognition emphasize that belief systems are adopted largely to satisfy some psychological 
need (see Jost et al. 2003 for a recent example and discussion of the relevant literature).
6  
An alternative approach, which we emphasize, focuses on how the economic 
structure might connect beliefs across issues through political and economic choices (see, 
e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001). A classic example in economics is Piketty (1995), who 
shows that people who believe effort pays are more likely to believe that low taxes are 
best — a connection that might be reinforced when people choose compensation 
schemes. In this paper we take this approach by emphasizing that people who believe 
effort pays will vote for (and choose privately) high-powered incentive schemes, which 
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will have a consequence on desired sentences because the type of people committing 
crimes in such settings will differ from those choosing to be criminals in places with low-
powered incentives. 
In Section 2 we present a simple model to illustrate how beliefs may cause 
differences in the way societies organize their economic systems, the types of criminals, 
and in the desired punishments. In Section 3 we present our three pieces of evidence: 
some cross-country evidence, evidence for the United States, and finally evidence from 
our experimental exercise. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. A MODEL WHERE BELIEFS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM CAUSE 
PUNISHMENT 
In this section we present a variation of the model in Di Tella and Dubra (2008) that 
incorporates several improvements. First, in order to analyze the increase in punitiveness 
and in the belief that effort pays in the United States in the past 30 years, we have 
incorporated income changes in order to study the role of GDP growth, an element that 
seems important in a model where beliefs matter.
7 Second, we provide a better (more 
precise) approach to modeling whether exerting effort is profitable. Finally, the model is 
more flexible because the source of variation across individuals is a “type,” which can 
now be interpreted in several ways. For example, as “laziness” (in accordance with the 
World Values Survey question concerning whether poverty is due to laziness or because 
of bad luck) or more generally as any other innate or “environmental” factor that makes 
effort by the individual more costly (for example, if the individual has erroneous 
perceptions about the “profitability” of exerting effort or if the individual’s education was 
not conducive to good work habits). This allows naturally for discussions of several 
topics that others have argued are important in the decision to commit crime (like 
segregation in particularly “bad” neighborhoods, or identity).
8 
The basic model has three agents: firms, workers, and the government who must 
simultaneously choose their actions. Firms must choose whether they want a market 
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technology, M, where effort and training by workers matters, or a bureaucracy, B, where 
output is independent of effort. Workers must choose whether they will be criminals, or 
they will work with low effort ￿￿ ￿ ￿, or work with high effort ￿￿ ￿ ￿. The government 
must choose a punishment level, time in jail, t for criminals. 
For a parameter g representing technological progress, the wealth level ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ of 
the individual when facing a technology ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ and exerting effort ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ is given 
by ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, and ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. In this paper, w is 
exogenous, but it can easily be made the endogenous result of a competitive model.  
Workers are of one of two types: low ￿￿ or high ￿￿, and let ￿ denote the probability 
of a type ￿￿. For a wealth level gw and effort e, an individual of type ￿ has a utility 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ if he chooses to work. As will be clear shortly, low types 
will be more likely to become criminals.  
From the form of the utility function, at least three interpretations arise: First, one can 
interpret ￿￿ as a hardworking type, since the cost of effort is lower than for the “lazy” 
type ￿￿: for the hardworking individual the cost of effort is ￿ ￿ ￿￿ while for the lazy one 
it is ￿ ￿ ￿￿. A second interpretation is that a type ￿￿ was raised in an environment with 
“low-quality” work habits, so that a greater effort level is required to obtain the same 
results as somebody who was raised in an environment conducive to “high-quality” work 
habits. In this case, the effort level e is not measured in “hours” but rather in effective 
units of effort. Finally, a somewhat related interpretation is that a type ￿￿ is one who 
believes that effort is not very useful (say, has a low productivity) and so a lot of hours of 
effort would be needed to obtain a certain objective; meanwhile a type ￿￿ thinks that 
effort is highly productive and that a small number of hours would suffice to obtain the 
given objective. In this interpretation, for example, eH could be “obtain a university 
degree,” while ￿￿ could be “be a high school graduate.” Types ￿￿ may then think that 
obtaining a degree would involve 20 hours of study per week, while types ￿￿ could 
believe that it would require 40 hours. 
The payoffs for the worker and the per-worker profit of the firm are presented in the 
matrices shown in Figure 2, where the matrix on the right has simplified using ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 




As we explain below, this economic structure gives rise to two different equilibria: 
the “American equilibrium” and what can be called the “French equilibrium.” In the 
American equilibrium most workers choose a high level of effort (or training) because 
they believe that effort pays; in this equilibrium, given that workers are exerting effort, it 
is profitable for firms to choose a market technology, and this “confirms” that workers’ 
beliefs that effort pays are correct in equilibrium. In the French equilibrium, workers 
anticipate that effort does not pay and choose low effort; firms correctly forecast this 
behavior and choose a bureaucracy, ensuring that workers’ beliefs that effort doesn’t pay 
are correct in equilibrium.
9  
If the individual decides to participate in the labor market, he collects his lifetime 
wealth and pays his effort cost. If he opts for crime, his payoff is ￿ ￿ ￿, where c is the 
expected utility of crime and ￿ is a taste shock for criminal activity. In order to link the 
punishment rate with the utility of the individuals, we assume that the direct utility from 
crime is a continuous function c(t) where the variable t is time in jail. Of course, other 
dimensions (like the probability of apprehension) matter, but in order to simplify our 
analysis we take them as given. We also assume that c is decreasing in t. The taste shock 
￿ is the meanness of the individual (a large ￿ is an unkind individual), which is drawn 
from a density f that is positive in its support [￿min, ￿max] and has a cumulative distribution 
function F. In Di Tella and Dubra (2008) we discuss alternative interpretations of ￿.  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9 For a model where stigma and self-fulfilling expectations of criminality lead to multiple equilibria, see 
Rasmusen (1996). 
Market Bureaucracy M B
High Effort gwh  - (1- ￿) eH, ￿￿ gwm - (1- ￿) eH, ￿￿ H gwh + ￿ - 1, ￿￿ gwm + ￿ - 1, ￿￿




Given a pair of presumed strategies (s,t) for the firm and the government, the 
individual decides whether to enter the crime market by comparing his utility ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ with ￿ ￿ ￿. He commits a crime if and only if ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. 
The government must choose the time in jail for a criminal, which in turn determines 
c. In other words, once the government has proved that the individual has committed a 
crime, it must decide the time t he must spend in jail. We assume that for some increasing 
function q, the government has a utility ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ of punishing with t years a type ￿; 
if the government knew that the individual was of a certain meanness ￿, it would choose 
a punishment level ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿. Since q is increasing, it means that the government wants to 
punish “worse” individuals more. More generally, and denoted by Eh the expected value 
with respect to a belief h about ￿, the government must choose t to maximize ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!. This yields a desired punishment of ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿!.  
To see why we obtain our basic results (higher punishment in America than in 
“France” and higher punishment in America today than 30 years ago), note that the 
government’s beliefs about the types of apprehended criminals, h in the formulation 
above, depends on the economic system. For example, if criminals in a certain 
environment are “meaner” on average than in another because economic opportunities 
are better (and hence only really mean individuals commit crimes), then the government 
will choose a harsher punishment.  
 
2.1 Two worked-out examples 
We now present two worked-out examples in order to illustrate how the model 
operates. 
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With these parameters, two equilibria arise: ￿￿￿
￿
·  The “American Dream equilibrium,” where the firm chooses a market technology, 
high-effort types exert effort while low-effort types don’t (a portion of each type 
commits crimes), and the government chooses a high punishment level. 
·  The “French equilibrium,” where the firm chooses a bureaucracy technology, all 
types exert low effort (and again, some individuals of each type commit crimes), 
and the government chooses a low punishment level. 
It is easy to check that these are the unique equilibria in pure strategies. We first 
analyze the “French equilibrium,” which is easier. Since workers are choosing low effort, 
it is a best response for the firm to choose a bureaucracy. Assume now that the desired 
punishment by the government is ￿, ￿
-
., and we will then check that this is indeed 
optimal. Given a bureaucracy, neither ￿￿ nor ￿￿ would choose to exert high effort, so the 
only choice is between low effort, which yields ￿￿ ￿
#
￿, or crime that gives ￿￿￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
#
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-
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-3. Then, the optimal strategy 
of the government is to choose ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿(￿ ￿! ￿ **￿ + *" ￿
-
., as was to be 
shown.  
The “American equilibrium” is somewhat more involved, since different ￿s behave 
differently.
10 In order to analyze the equilibrium, assume that the desired punishment by 
the government in this case is ￿4 ￿
-
%, and we will then check that this is indeed the 
optimal thing to do. A type ￿￿ with meanness ￿ has to choose among: high effort, which 
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% ￿ ￿. Therefore, he commits a crime if and only if 
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￿. Similarly, low types ￿￿ commit crimes if and only if ￿ / ￿. Since all types ￿ 
greater than 
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￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 8 ( ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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Therefore, the posterior belief that a criminal has a type ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
-
￿ is the probability 
of a type in that range, times the probability that it is a ￿￿, divided by the probability of a 
crime being committed: 





















Hence the expected value of ￿ in the American equilibrium is: the probability that ￿ is 
in [0, 
-
￿] multiplied by the expected value conditional on ￿ in that interval (which is just 
the midpoint of the interval), plus the probability that ￿ is greater than 
-
￿, multiplied by the 
expected value conditional on that interval (again, the midpoint between 
-
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Then, the optimal strategy of the government is ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿(￿ ￿! ￿ **￿ +
*" ￿
-
%, as was to be shown. Given the strategies of workers, where most exert high effort 
(a proportion larger than & ￿
#
%), it is optimal for firms to choose a market technology. 
This completes the analysis of the first example, where punishment in the American 
equilibrium is larger than in the French equilibrium. 
The above example concerns a “cross section of punitiveness levels.” Our second 
worked-out example concerns the analysis of a “time series” of what happens when the 
economy grows. In order to analyze this case, we leave all parameter values as before, 
but increase g from 1 to ￿ ￿
3
$. This has the effect of raising wages in both the French 




2￿< while ￿4 is approximately 
-3
￿$. The desired punishment increased by 15 percent 
in the French equilibrium, while it increased by 160 percent in the American equilibrium. 
If we interpret growth in g as the increase in incomes during the 1980s and 1990s, this 
example illustrates two stylized facts from the imprisonment literature: a small increase 
in severity in the “French equilibrium” (and more generally around the world, see 
Walmsley 2007) and an even larger increase in the desired punishment in the “American 
equilibrium.” 
The appendix discusses possible ways to extend the model, connecting it to issues 
that others have claimed to be relevant to the crime-punishment discussion (such as 
biased sampling in segregated neighborhoods). 
 
3. THREE PIECES OF EVIDENCE 
We now focus on three pieces of evidence connecting beliefs and punitiveness. As 
emphasized above, the evidence is only suggestive of the relationship outlined in the 
model, as establishing tight causal links is beyond the scope of the paper. Note also that 
there are many peculiarities of the U.S. penal system (and several of them contribute to 
increases in punitiveness, such as “truth-in-sentencing” laws), but we do not review them 
here (see, e.g., Austin et al. 2000).
11 Instead, we selectively include pieces of evidence 
that we see as relevant to a theory connecting imprisonment to beliefs. 
Before presenting the evidence, we note some selected observations related to the 
evolution of the U.S. data. First and most basic is that punitiveness in the United States is 
higher now than it was historically. See Figure 1 above. Several legal initiatives gradually 
loosened restrictions on the activities of law enforcement officials in the 1970s. Later on, 
the Comprehensive Crime Control and Sentencing Reform Acts of 1984 introduced 
stricter sentencing (mandatory minimums for many categories of drug- and gun-related 
offenses) and new search and seizure powers. Over time, truth-in-sentencing laws have 
been introduced federally and in several states. These require prisoners to serve 85 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
   ￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿7￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿:￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ;￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿:￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿<￿￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿:( ￿ ￿ ￿5 #￿￿  ! ! ! ￿￿￿￿￿
￿
percent of their sentence before being eligible for parole. In 1994, a popular ballot 
initiative brought in California’s controversial “Three Strikes Law,” with lengthy and 
mandatory prison terms for repeat offenders. Simultaneously, it is possible to observe 
reductions in prison alternatives (electronic monitoring) and re-entry programs (including 
parole, probation, psychiatric care, and rehabilitation). The increase in imprisonment was 
not steady, with a clear break around 1980 — a time when ideological changes associated 
with the Reagan revolution took place (some are documented in Section 3.2. below). The 
rate of incarceration in the United States hovered around 100 per 100,000 population 
from the 1920s (when we first have readily available data) to 1980, when it began an 
upward trend. During the early 2000s it stabilized somewhat. Indeed, formal estimates (as 
in Perron 2005) indicate structural breaks in 1978 and 2001.  
A substantial part of this increase has taken place in minimum security prisons.
12 
Between 1979 and 2005, the percentage of inmates held in maximum security was 
halved, from 40 percent to 20 percent; the percentage of inmates in minimum security 
nearly doubled, from 18 percent to 34 percent.
13 In 1979, state prisons held less than one 
minimum security prisoner for every maximum security prisoner; in 2005, state prisons 
held nearly three minimum security prisoners for every one maximum security prisoner. 
It appears that a lot of the changes in incarceration rates involve offenders who are 
judged to be less dangerous.  
As is well known, some minorities are imprisoned at disproportionate rates. For 
example, the black incarceration rate (relative to the black population) is substantially 
higher than the white incarceration rate, in some states by a factor of almost 10 (see, e.g., 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
12 One factor is longer sentences for less severe crimes. The “war on drugs” has played a role, as there has 
been a substantial increase in those incarcerated for drug offenses. Austin et al. (2000) write: 
[I]n 1980 the number of prisoners convicted for a drug offense was six percent of the 
state prison population, which numbered less than 300,000. By 1998 the numbers had 
increased by 237,000, or 21 percent of the state prison population. Furthermore, the 
average sentence for drug offenses had increased from 13 months in 1985 to 30 months 
by 1994. 
At the federal level the increase was 10-fold. Mauer (2008) reports that burglars in the United States serve 
an average of 16 months in prison, whereas in Canada they serve five months on average (and seven 
months in England).￿
13 The estimates in this paragraph use population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau (various years) 
and inmate statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and 
Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, 1979, 1984, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. ￿￿￿
￿
Mauer and Ryan 2007). Convincing evidence of racism is provided by Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2011) who study all death penalty appeals that became final between 1973 and 
1995 and show that the probability of judicial error is up to 9 percentage points higher for 
minority defendants who killed white victims than for those who killed minority 
victims.
14 There is a large body of work on racism and the mass incarceration of so many 
black (and Hispanic) young men, which we do not review here (for a recent example, see 
Alexander 2010). Even though these accounts make many valid points, they fail to 
account for the simple fact that few people who support punishment see themselves as 
racist. Interestingly, a first look at the evidence suggests that the increase in the overall 
incarceration rate has approximately preserved the 1980 differences in incarceration rates 
by race. Given that there was large difference in 1980, the increase in imprisonment has 
affected blacks disproportionately. As a percent of the total population in each group, the 
incarceration rates of blacks was over six times that of whites both in 1980 and in 2009.
15 
TABLE 1 















1980  0.18%  1.11%  6.3 
1990  0.36%  2.36%  6.6 
2000  0.41%  3.41%  8.3 
2009  0.43%  2.99%  6.9 
  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
14 Other work in criminology has studied bias in the legal system using the assumption that racial 
differences in arrests indicate differences in criminal involvement. One study concluded that close to 76 
percent of the racial bias in imprisonment can be attributed to differences in criminal involvement of racial 
groups (see Blumstein 1993; in 1978 this proportion was 80 percent). Although the assumption of unbiased 
arrest rates seems contrary to anecdotal evidence (we were unable to find convincing studies that could be 
generalized), Hindelang (1978) found that the racial differences in arrests mirrored racial identities of 
offenders as reported by the victims in the National Crime Victimization Survey, although this evidence 
refers to the period prior to the escalation in imprisonment.  
15 Calculations based on “Correctional Populations in the United States and National Prisoner Statistics,” 
U.S. Department of Justice. Population figures taken from U.S. Census estimates.  ￿￿￿
￿
It is interesting to compare the United States with other countries. In 2007, the 
incarceration rate in the United States was 756 per 100,000 population, whereas it was 
significantly lower for Europe (average of 125). Although in some countries there 
certainly was an increase in imprisonment, the dynamics are nowhere as extreme as in the 
United States. Canada, which in many ways is a good counterfactual, is characterized by 
its stability: since the 1950s it has imprisoned approximately 100 per 100,000 population 
(Webster and Doob 2007).
16  
Crime rates in the United States are not generally much higher than those prevailing 
in Europe. See Table 2 for data for a U.S.-Europe comparison across crime categories 
during the late 1990s. Homicide is the one possible exception: Figure 3 provides a graph 
of incarceration rates and a measure of homicides (from the World Health Organization). 
Incarceration and homicide rates have a mildly positive correlation (see Bushway and 
Paternoster 2009 and Durlauf and Nagin 2010 for clear discussions, including the 
difficulties in making causal interpretations given the possible presence of deterrent and 
political economy effects, as well as references to previous work). The United States is 
still an outlier, with extremely high levels of incarceration. This is the same conclusion 
emerging from the study by Raphael and Stoll (2009), who decompose the changes in 
incarceration and find that only a small proportion of the increase is attributable to 
increases in criminal behavior (at most 17 percent of total growth). These authors 
attribute the bulk of the increase to longer time served and to an increase in the likelihood 
of being sent to prison (conditional on committing a crime).
17 
   
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
16 Unfortunately, it is not possible to see if Quebec has different punitiveness than the rest of Canada 
looking at imprisonment rates due to several features of the Canadian legal system (for example, there is a 
lot of shifting of prisoners across provinces). See Doob and Webster (2006). Furthermore, the Canadian 
federal system (which holds those sentenced to more than two years) is quite substantial and it is not easy 
to obtain data on the province in which they were sentenced. For 1995 and 2003, the three largest provinces 
(British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec) are quite similar in their overall imprisonment rates. We are 
extremely grateful to Anthony Doob for providing us with these data. Kensey and Tournier (1999) describe 
prison inflation in France in detail. Walmsley (2007) writes that prison populations have risen in 69 percent 
of European countries.  
17 These authors note that average time served in the aggregate has not increased even though we now have 
longer sentences (conditional on type of crime.). The reason is that prison admissions have shifted toward 
less serious offenses, consistent with the increase in minimum security prisons we document. ￿￿￿
￿
TABLE 2 
Crime and Punishment in the United States and Europe, Late 1990s 





   Total  Car  Property  Sex  Person 
     
United States  645  24.2  5,375  19.6  10.8  2.5  5.7 
Europe  88  25.2  7,984  19  9.6  2.9  4 
 Austria  85  18.8  6,285  11.7  6.6  3.8  2.1 
 Canada  115  25.2  9,979  17.3  13.1  2.7  4 
 England & Wales  125  30.9  n/a  24.7  12.8  2  5.9 
 Finland  55  18.9  7,650  12.9  5  2.5  4.1 
 France  90  25.3  6,765  20.7  9.5  0.9  3.9 
 Netherlands  85  31.5  7,422  25.9  13.3  3.6  4 
 Sweden  60  24  12,670  20  7.5  2.9  4.5 
 Switzerland  90  26.7  5,116  18.6  9  4.6  3.1 
     
  
              
NOTES: The figures for Europe correspond to the unweighted average across the European countries in the 
table. Data on incarceration rates comes from the first edition of the World Prison Population List. 
Incarceration Rates are prison populations per 100,000 of national population. The incarceration rates are 
from 1997, except for England and Wales and France, where the data are from 1998. Crime is the total 
recorded crime per 100,000 population from the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. All data are from 1994 except for the Netherlands, which are for 
1986. Victim Rate is the victimization rate (the proportion of the population victimized in one year), for 1995 
(the latest year available) in Mayhew, P. and J.J.M. van. Dijk Criminal Victimization in 11 Industrialized 
Countries: Key Findings from the 1996 International Crime Victims Survey, The Hague: Ministry of Justice, 
WODC, 1997. Car is victimization rates for car theft, theft from car, car damage, motorcycle theft, and 
bicycle theft from the same surveys. Property is victimization for burglary, attempt at burglary, robbery, and 
theft of personal property from the same surveys. Sex is sexual offenses victimization from the same surveys. 
Person is assault and threat victimization from the same surveys. 
 
   ￿￿￿
￿
FIGURE 3 
Prison Population and Homicides on OECD Countries 
2004 
 
NOTES: The variable on the y-axis (Prison Population) is the number of prisoners in the country’s national 
prison system (including pretrial detainees/remand prisoners) per 100,000 of the country’s national 
population. The source is the World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, 2003. The 
variable on the x-axis (Homicides) is the number of homicides (defined as unlawful death purposefully 
inflicted on a person by another person) per 100,000 of the country’s national population in 2004. The data 
were obtained from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s homicide statistics, which are based 
on public health sources. The sample covers 31 OECD countries. 
 
3.1 Punishment and Economic Beliefs in the United States and Other Developed 
Countries 
Given the difficulties in interpreting data involving legal definitions across countries, 
and that incarceration confounds the amount of crime, enforcement efforts, and other 
factors with desired punitiveness, it is useful to study alternative measures. We derive a 
measure of desired punishment from the 2004–2005 International Crime Victim Survey 
(ICVS). This is a comprehensive survey developed to monitor crime, perception of crime, ￿￿￿
￿
and attitudes toward the criminal justice system in a comparative international 
perspective, financed largely by the United Nations and the European Union.
18 The main 
question for our purposes is:  
People have different ideas about the sentences which should be given to 
offenders. Take for instance the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty 
of burglary for the second time. This time, he has stolen a colour TV. Which of 
the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case: (1) 
Fine, (2) Prison, (3) Community service, (4) Suspended sentence, (5) Any other 
sentence. 
A simple way to summarize the data is through the percentage of respondents opting for 
imprisonment as punishment for the recidivist burglar. The percentage of the public 
opting for imprisonment as punishment for a recidivist burglar in the United States was 
47, while the average for 22 European countries included in the sample was 25.4 (s.e. 
2.4).  
Data on beliefs about the economic system come from the fifth wave of the World 
Values Survey (2005–2008). The first belief that we use is based on the standard question 
on self-placement the ideological spectrum:  
In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would 
you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 
The response takes values from 1 to 10, where 1 is Left and 10 is Right.  
The second belief is constructed based on the following question:  
Now I' d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place 
your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on 
the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if 
your views fall somewhere in between, you can chose any number in between.  
Agreement: Hard work brings success. 
We inverted the scale so that 1 means “Hard work doesn´t generally bring success — it´s 
more a matter of luck and connections,” and 10 means “In the long run, hard work 
usually brings a better life.”  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
18 Standardized questionnaires and other aspects of data collection provide some reassurance regarding data 
quality. The biggest apparent drawback is that it is telephone-based, although it appears that experimental 
work in the Netherlands comparing answers to the ICVS survey using telephone (CATI) interviews with 
face-to-face interviews produce similar results (see Scherpenzeel 2001, cited in van Dijk et al. 2008). ￿￿￿
￿
The last belief is constructed based on the following question: 
Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of 
democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you 
think it is as a characteristic of democracy:  
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 
We inverted the scale so 1 means “It definitely is an essential characteristic of 
democracy,” and 10 means “Not at all an essential characteristic of democracy.” Note 
that these beliefs are coded so that higher numbers indicate the respondent is closer to 
what is typically interpreted as the right end of the ideological spectrum. As revealed by 
several prior papers (see, e.g., Alesina et al. 2001), beliefs in the United States are more 
toward the right end of the ideological spectrum than in Europe.  
More interestingly, Figure 4 reveals that there is a positive relationship between right-
wing answers (using the three measures of beliefs) and the percentage of people 
recommending prison in the ICVS question. In Di Tella and Dubra (2008) similar results 
are presented using somewhat different samples. 
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NOTES: The variable on the y-axis is derived from the question: “People have different ideas about the 
sentences which should be given to offenders. Take for instance the case of a man of 20 years old who is 
found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time, he has stolen a colour TV. Which of the following 
sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case: (1) Fine, (2) Prison, (3) Community 
service, (4) Suspended sentence, (5) Any other sentence.” (ICVS, 2004–2005) The y-axis variable is the 
percentage of the public opting for imprisonment as punishment for the recidivist burglar. The x-axes use 
data on beliefs about the economic system from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005–2008). In 
panel (a) the belief comes from the question: “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are 
essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you 
think it is as a characteristic of democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.” We inverted 
the scale so 1 means “It definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy,” and 10 means “Not at all an 
essential characteristic of democracy.” In panel (b) the question used is: “Now I'd like you to tell me your 
views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with 
the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views 
fall somewhere in between, you can chose any number in between. Agreement: Hard work brings success.” 
We inverted the scale such that 1 means “Hard work doesn´t generally bring success — it´s more a matter 
of luck and connections,” and 10 means “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.” Panel (c) 
uses self-placement: “In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place 
your views on this scale, generally speaking?” The response takes values from 1 to 10, where 1 is Left and 
10 is Right. 
 
3.2 The Punishment–Economic Beliefs Correlation in the United States 
We now turn to evidence within the United States. We divide the evidence into 
movements in the aggregate data in the United States and correlations across states; we 




































































Data on beliefs come from the U. S. General Social Survey (GSS), a repeated cross-
section of randomly sampled Americans (for a description see Davis and Smith 2005). 
Each survey is an independently drawn sample of English-speaking persons 18 years of 
age or over, living in the United States. One of the basic purposes of the GSS is to gather 
data on contemporary American society in order to monitor and explain trends and 
constants in attitudes, behaviors, and attributes. We focus on two concerning the role of 
effort (vs. luck) in the income-generating process, which might loosely be called “self-
reliance.”  
The first question in the GSS that can serve such purpose is:  
Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that 
lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think 
is most important?”  
The options were “Hard work most important,” “Hard work, luck equally important,” and 
“Luck most important.” We created the variable Effort Pays, which takes the value 1 if 
the individual responded “Luck most important,” 2 if the individual responded “Hard 
work, luck equally important,” and 3 if the individual responded “Hard work most 
important.” (We treat “Don’t Know” as a missing value.) Thus, higher values of Effort 
Pays can be interpreted as an individual that is more likely to believe that effort pays. 
The second alternative measure of self-reliance can be created exploiting the answers 
to the following question:  
Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything 
possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 
1. Other people think it is not the government' s responsibility, and that each 
person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. Where would you place 
yourself on this scale, or haven' t you made up your mind on this? 
We created the variable Not-Washington, which is simply the answer to the question, so 
that higher values mean that the respondent is more “individualist” in the sense that he 
believes that each person should take care of him. (We treat “Don’t Know” as a missing 
value.)  
The questions discussed above are not present in all of the years in the GSS, although 
they are present in most years after 1983. As a consequence, we will use 1984–2008 as ￿￿￿
￿
our sample frame.




Desire to Punish    
Death Penalty  "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" 1 if the 
individual answered "Favor" and 0 if the individual answered either "Oppose" or "Don’t 
Know." 
Courts  "In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with 
criminals?" (1) Too harsh; (2) About right; (3) Not harsh enough. 
Beliefs about Self 
Reliance 
  
Effort Pays  "Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks 
or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important? Hard 
work most important (3); Hard work, luck equally important (2); or Luck most important 
(1)." 
Not-Washington  "Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to 
improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1. Other people think 
it is not the government' s responsibility and that each person should take care of himself; 
they are at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven' t you have up 
your mind on this?" Scale is inverted. 




   Observa
tions  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
  
       
  
Death Penalty  27,915  0.7  0.46  0  1 
Courts  31,056  2.75  0.55  1  3 
Effort Pays  19,092  2.54  0.7  1  3 
Not-Washington  18,667  2.91  1.16  1  5 
NOTES: Data from the General Social Survey over the years 1984–2008. 
See Table 3 for data definitions. 
 
3.2.1 Aggregate Data 
Figure 5 shows the co-evolution of imprisonment rates and two measures of self-
reliance beliefs (Effort Pays and Not-Washington) over the sample period.
20 The 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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￿
incarceration rate increased sharply during the period 1984–1998 and has stabilized since 
then. Both Effort Pays and Not-Washington increased during the same period 1984–1998 
and they have decreased somewhat since then. Figure 6 splits the GSS sample into white 
respondents and those self-identifying as black. The black sub-sample is considerably 
smaller, so Figure 6 is only suggestive of any real differences across whites and blacks. 
Still, it is interesting to note that  
·  blacks tend to believe less in the prevalence of the “American Dream”: values 
for both Effort Pays and Not-Washington are lower for blacks than for whites; 
and  
·  there seems to be some increase in the percentage of blacks reporting the 
typical right-wing answers.  
Even though the data are far too noisy for definite conclusions, this last observation 
points to the intriguing possibility that what enables harsher punishment in America is the 
increases in the belief in economic opportunity among blacks, which is the group most 
affected by the policy. In other words, the legitimacy of punishment also appears to have 
increased during this period. 
   
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
20 We measure punishment as the number of prisoners in state correctional facilities per 100,000 of state 
population (also includes prisoners sentenced in federal courts, but serving in state prisons) compiled by the 
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation using data from the U.S. Census Bureau. ￿￿￿
￿
FIGURE 5 




NOTES: Data on beliefs are year averages from the General Social Survey. See Not-
Washington and Effort Pays in Table 3 for the data definitions. The incarceration rate is 
the number of sentenced inmates incarcerated under state and federal jurisdiction per 
100,000 population. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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Self-reliance Beliefs and Incarceration Rates over Time in the United States 
 
 
NOTES: Data on beliefs are within-race year averages from the General Social Survey. 
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rate is the number of sentenced inmates incarcerated under state and federal jurisdiction 
per 100,000 population. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
   ￿￿￿
￿
The GSS also reports data that can be interpreted as “desired punishment”: the 
answers to the question: “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted 
of murder?” We create the variable Death Penalty, which takes the value 1 if the 
individual answered “Favor” and 0 if the individual answered either “Oppose” or “Don’t 
Know.”
21 Note that Death Penalty measures a particularly extreme form of punishment, 
which may differ from desires to punish using jails and prisons. Our model does not 
distinguish between these two forms of punishment, but in richer psychological models 
these two desires may differ. For example, a person that is religious may cherish all 
forms of life and refuse to kill convicted criminals, but may certainly favor long 
sentences for criminals. Another question available from the GSS on desired punishment 
is Courts, namely "In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not 
harshly enough with criminals?" and gives very similar results. 
These data (on punitiveness from the GSS) are useful for many reasons. First, while 
the incarceration rate gives a measure of actual punishment, Death Penalty is a measure 
of desired punishment. The relationship between individual beliefs and incarceration 
rates is indirect and involves a time lag: beliefs affect political choices, which in turn may 
affect aspects of the economic system (such as tax rates), and then there would be an 
effect on future incarceration rates. On the contrary, the relationship between individual 
beliefs and Death Penalty is both direct and contemporaneous. Second, the data on Death 
Penalty vary at the individual level, while the data on incarceration rates vary at the state 
level only. Third, the GSS data are only representative at the national level, not at the 
state level. This implies a noisy relationship between GSS state-average beliefs and state-
average incarceration rates. This can be avoided by using all data from the GSS (e.g., 
Death Penalty or Courts to capture punitiveness).  
Figure 7 looks at the raw correlation of beliefs on self-reliance and desired 
punishment for the cross-section of U.S. states, with both measures originating in the 
GSS sample (so the lack of representative sample is not as serious). The data correspond 
to the state averages for the period 1984–2008. States where individuals have more self-
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
21 The share of individuals answering “Don’t Know” is very stable over time and close to 5 percent. All the 
results are practically the same if we treat those observations as missing values instead. ￿￿￿
￿
reliance beliefs display a higher share of the population in favor of the death penalty. This 
is consistent with the cross-country evidence presented before. 
FIGURE 7 
Self-reliance Beliefs and Desired Punishment across U.S. States 
 
 
NOTES: Data on beliefs are state averages from the General Social Survey. See Not-
Washington, Effort Pays, and Death Penalty in Table 3 for the data definitions. 
 
3.2.2 Individual Data 
The GSS data allow us to study further the aggregate correlation between self-
reliance and punishment in more detail, for example conditioning on other observable 
information (e.g., individual controls, state income inequality, state crime rates, etc.). 
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using a regression framework. The variable on the left-hand side of the estimating 
equation is Death Penalty (columns 1–4) and Courts (columns 5–8). As right-hand side 
variable we use Effort Pays (and in separate regressions, Not-Washington).
22 The 
regressions are OLS and the results are qualitatively the same if, instead, we use a 
logit/probit model. All regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the state level. All regressions include time effects and state fixed effects. The 
individual-level control variables are: age of respondent, gender, a dummy for African-
American race, a dummy for whites, a set of three dummies for marital status, income, a 
set of five dummies for employment status, education, number of adults, and number of 
children in household. The state-level control variables are: crime rate for homicides, 
property crime rate, current real GDP per capita, GDP growth, income inequality (Gini 
coefficient), share of African-American population, and the share of white population.
23 
In order to control semi-parametrically for other macro variables, we also include a set of 
state-specific time trends. 
   
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
22 In Table 12 of their paper, Alesina et al. (2001) present a regression that connects Death Penalty with 
Not-Washington with a different set of controls (and also obtain a strong correlation) and provide a broader 
discussion of the possible reasons for the differences in welfare policy across Europe and America.  




Punitive Regression Results 
Dependent Variable:  Death Penalty     Courts 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
     
Effort Pays  0.022***  0.016*** 
     
0.044***  0.037*** 
 
  
   -0.004  -0.004 
     




   
0.057***  0.039*** 
     
0.046***  0.037*** 
  
   
-0.003  -0.003 
     
-0.004  -0.004 
  
               
  
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
State Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
State-specific time trends  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
     
Observations  22,309  22,093  21,843  21,620 
 
21,074  20,871  20,580  20,378 
R-squared  0.01  0.08  0.03  0.09 
 
0.04  0.07  0.05  0.08 
Number of States  49  49  49  49 
 
49  49  49  49 
                             ￿￿￿
￿
NOTES: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Left-hand side variable: columns (1) to (4) is Death Penalty; Columns (5) to (8) is Courts. The 
individual-level control variables are: age of respondent, gender, a dummy for African-American race, a dummy for white, a 
dummy for American citizen, a set of three dummies for marital status, income, a set of five dummies for employment status, 
education, number of adults, and number of children in household. The state-level control variables are: crime rate for 
homicides, property crime rate,  current real GDP per capita, GDP growth, income inequality (Gini coefficient), share of 
African-American population, and the share of white population.  
SOURCES: Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) for years: 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. See Table A for data definitions, and Table 3 for descriptive statistics. 
 ￿￿￿
￿
As seen in Table 5, the correlation between Effort Pays and Death Penalty is positive 
and statistically significant, even after accounting for many parametric and semi-
parametric controls. That is to say, self-reliance beliefs are associated with harsher 
desired punishment. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient does decrease when 
including individual controls. The same findings are true for the correlation between Not-
Washington and Death Penalty, or when we use Courts (columns 5–8) as left-hand side 
variable.  
The coefficient on Effort Pays is significant from an economic point of view. For 
example, in a causal interpretation a one-standard-deviation increase in Effort Pays (0.7) 
would increase Death Penalty by almost 8 percentage points (0.7 × 0.11). The coefficient 
on Not-Washington is also economically significant: a standard-deviation increase in Not-
Washington (1.16) would increase Death Penalty by almost 4.5 percentage points (1.16 × 
0.038). Similar conclusions are obtained when Courts is used. 
 
3.3. An Experiment Where Some Students Face Criminals Who Had Opportunities 
Growing Up 
The experiment took place at a large business school of an Ivy League university in 
April 2011. The participants were potentially a highly selected sample. All 180 students 
from a second-year class on macroeconomics were sent invitations to participate in the 
online survey. The name of the survey was “Survey of Attitudes,” and students had to 
prepare a class on Jamaica and were given material on the macroeconomic performance 
of Jamaica and the country’s relationship with the International Monetary Fund. They 
were told that the survey was anonymous and that it would only take five minutes to 
complete it. Most students were second-year MBA students, although there were a 
handful of exceptions (e.g., Ph.D. students). Students were not offered any money or 
course credit for participating in the survey. However, the professor in charge of the class 
sent the invitation with the link to the online survey from his own email address; this 
probably contributed to the high response rate: 128 out of 180 students logged in and 
completed the entire survey. The survey was posted on a Monday morning and students ￿￿￿
￿
were given until Tuesday midnight to participate. Some 115 out of the 128 respondents 
(90 percent) completed the survey on Monday. 
The online survey consisted of four consecutive screens. The first screen was exactly 
the same for all respondents and included a series of nine demographic questions about 
the respondent (e.g., gender, age, relative income). Once they finished answering those 
questions, respondents were shown a second screen with some brief information about 
education and crime in Jamaica.  
Participants were randomized into two groups. The Cherry Gardens group saw the 
following description: 
Jamaica’s development has been extremely uneven. In some regions of the country, 
economic growth was significant and there was substantial progress in areas like 
health and education. For example, in the neighborhoods around Cherry Gardens in 
Kingston, public schools (which are free, government run) had very attractive 
teacher/pupil ratios (on average 24:1), with a large proportion of students 
graduating high school (on average 81%), and most of them obtaining jobs, many 
of them very well paid. The statistics reveal that crime is a serious problem, both in 
rich and in poor neighborhoods.  
Recently, there has been an intense debate regarding the sentences that should be 
given to offenders. We would like to know your opinion about this issue. Take for 
instance the case of a 21 year old man from the Cherry Gardens area who was 
found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time, he has stolen a TV. 
The Jones Town group saw the following description: 
Jamaica’s development has been extremely uneven. In some regions of the 
country, economic growth was non-existent and there was no progress in areas 
like health or education. For example, in the neighborhoods around Jones Town 
in Kingston, public schools (which are free, government run) had very 
unattractive teacher/pupil ratios (on average 41:1), with a low proportion of 
students graduating high school (on average 31%), and only a minority of them 
obtaining jobs, few of which were well paid. The statistics reveal that crime is a 
serious problem, both in rich and in poor neighborhoods.  
Recently, there has been an intense debate regarding the sentences that should be 
given to offenders. We would like to know your opinion about this issue. Take 
for instance the case of a 21 year old man from the Jones Town area who was 
found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time, he has stolen a TV.  
Relative to the Jones Town treatment, the Cherry Gardens treatment depicts a more 
positive image of Jamaica, where most people can get a job if they put their minds to it.  ￿￿￿
￿
Right after the randomized treatment, respondents were asked their opinion about 
what the government should do with the individual in the example:  
Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such 
a case? A. Fine; B. Prison; C. Community service; D. Suspended sentence. 
This question closely resembles the question in the ICVS discussed in Section 3.1.  
After answering this question, the respondent was presented with another question 
about the example:  
The judge decided to send him to prison. For how long do you think he should go 
to prison? A. 1 month or less; B. 2–6 months; C. 6 months–12 months; D. 1 year; 
E. 2 years; …; N. Life Sentence.  
This is another question included in the ICVS.  
After answering that question, the respondent was asked a final question about the 
example:  
The government is considering a proposal whereby prisoners would be offered 
reductions in their sentences if they complete their education (primary and 
secondary courses would be expanded and made available in all Jamaican 
prisons). Do you agree with this proposal? A. Strongly Disagree; B. Disagree; C. 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree; D. Agree; E. Strongly Agree. 
The third and fourth screens had all the information about the treatment introduced in the 
second screen, in case the respondent needed a refresher.  
The data definitions of the variables used appear in Table 6, and their corresponding 
descriptive statistics appear in Table 7. A total of 65 respondents were in the Cherry 
Gardens group and 63 in the Jones Town group. As a routine check that the treatment 
was balanced, Table 8 shows the differences by treatment group in responses to pre-
treatment questions. 





Cherry Gardens  
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual in the example belonged to the Cherry 
Gardens group, and 0 if belonged to the Jones Town group. 
Respondents were then given the following text: "Take for instance the case of a 21-year-old man from the [Cherry 





Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case? (1) 
Fine; (2) Prison; (3) Community service; (4) Suspended sentence. 
Prison 




“The judge decided to send him to prison. For how long do you think he should go to prison?” 
The options were given in bins, as in the original ICVS question. To construct months of 
incarceration, we compute the mean (in months) of each bin (noted in parenthesis): 1 month or 
less (0.5); 2–6 months (4); 6 months–12 months (8.5); 1 year (18); 2 years (30). Since there 
were no responses above 2 years, we will not care about those cases. 
Rehabilitation 
The government is considering a proposal whereby prisoners would be offered reductions in 
their sentences if they complete their education (primary and secondary courses would be 
expanded and made available in all Jamaican prisons). Do you agree with this proposal? (1) 
Strongly Disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither Agree Nor Disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly 
Agree. 
Pre-Treatment    
Female  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is female. 
Age  Age of respondent in years. 
American  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual grew up in the United States. ￿￿￿
￿
Never Married  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual has never been married. 
Number of Children  Number of children that the respondent has. 
Relative Income 
Compared to your classmates…, would you say that your family income while you were 
growing up was below average, about average, or above average? (1) Well below average; (2) 
Somewhat below average; (3) About average; (4) Somewhat above average; (5) Well above 
average.  
Stay in America 
Are you planning on staying in the United States after graduation, for at least 5 years? (1) No, 
unlikely; (2) Undecided; (3) Yes, likely. 
Monday 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual answered the survey on Monday, and 0 
if answered on the next day. 





   Observations  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Cherry Gardens   128  0.51  0.5  0  1 
Punitiveness  127  2.57  0.7  1  4 
Prison  127  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Months of 
incarceration  127  6.32  6.31  0.5  30 
Rehabilitation  128  4.13  0.9  1  5 
Female  128  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Age  128  27.24  1.6  24  33 
American  128  0.46  0.5  0  1 
Never Married  128  0.83  0.38  0  1 
Number of Children  128  0.05  0.32  0  3 
Relative Income  128  2.52  1.16  1  5 
Stay in America  128  2.2  0.92  1  3 
Monday  128  0.9  0.3  0  1 
SOURCE: Data from the online experiment survey. 
 
TABLE 8 





Town   Difference
1  |t|
2 
Female  0.385  0.286  0.099  1.182 
Age  27.015  27.476  -0.461  1.644 
American  0.4  0.524  -0.124  1.405 
Never Married  0.846  0.81  0.037  0.546 
Number of 
Children  0.046  0.063  -0.017  0.31 
Relative Income  2.569  2.476  0.093  0.454 
Stay in America  1.923  1.683  0.241  1.482 
Monday  0.923  0.873  0.05  0.933 
Observations  65  63 
 
  
NOTES: The first two columns display the mean of the variables within each 
group. 
1Cherry Gardens – Jones Town. 
2The t-statistic from the mean-
difference test whose null hypothesis is that the means are equal between the 
Cherry Gardens and Jones Town groups. 
SOURCE: Data from the online experiment survey.  
 
The hypothesis is that respondents in the Cherry Gardens group will want to punish 
criminal behavior more severely because they perceive that the individual in the example ￿￿￿
￿
had better opportunities not to become a criminal. As expected, the three measures of 
desired punishment suggest that people in the Cherry Gardens group desired more severe 
punishments compared to the Jones Town group. The first measure of punishment is the 
type of sentence. Figure 6 shows the distribution of responses for both groups. There are 
no major differences in the proportion of people choosing fine and suspended sentence, 
but there are major differences in the percentage of people choosing prison and 
community service. The simplest way to compare the answers is to look at what 
percentage of respondents chose prison, the most severe option. Some 45 percent of 
respondents in the Cherry Gardens group chose prison, compared to 32 percent in the 
Jones Town group. The p-value of the two-sided mean difference test is 0.155 (one-sided 
yields 0.078). Although the difference is (marginally) not significant at the 10 percent 
level, it is statistically significant once we include a set of control variables in order to 
improve precision, as shown later.  
FIGURE 8 
Differences in Desired Sentences by Treatment Groups 
 
NOTES: Number of observations: 127. See Punitiveness in Table 6 for data definition. 
SOURCE: Data from the online experiment survey. 
 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of responses to the second post-treatment question by 
treatment group. Relative to the Jones Town group, people in the Cherry Gardens group 
are less likely to choose prison sentences between 2 and 12 months and more likely to 
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choose prison sentences between 1 and 2 years. In order to be able to compare the 
responses cardinally, we constructed the variable Months of Incarceration, which takes 
the value of the mean number of months in the corresponding option (e.g., 4.5 months for 
the category “3–6 months”). The difference between the Cherry Gardens and Jones Town 
groups is statistically significant at conventional levels: the p-value of the two-sided test 
of mean difference is 0.097.  
FIGURE 9 
Differences in Desired Incarcerations by Treatment Groups 
 
NOTES: Number of observations: 128. See Incarceration in Table 6 for data definition. 
SOURCE: Data from the online experiment survey. 
 
Finally, Figure 10 presents the distribution of answers for the question on the support 
for the rehabilitation program. In both Cherry Gardens and Jones Town groups, most 
people responded either “Partially Agree” or “Strongly Agree” (89 percent of 
respondents). However, relative to the Jones Town group, respondents in the Cherry 
Gardens group were much more likely to agree partially rather than strongly. The 
difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels: the p-value of the two-
sided difference test is 0.228 (the p-value of the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test is 
0.056). Nevertheless, the results are statistically significant when introducing control 
variables as a mean of increasing precision, as shown below. 
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FIGURE 10 
Differences in Support for Rehabilitation Programs by Treatment Groups 
 
NOTES: Number of observations: 128. See Rehabilitation in Table 6 for data definition. 
SOURCE: Data from the online experiment survey. 
 
In order to increase the precision of the estimates, we will perform the same mean-
difference test, but in a regression fashion. The dependent variables are going to be three 
different measures of desired punitiveness. The first is Prison, a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the individual recommended a prison sentence instead of a fine, 
community service, or suspended sentence. The second dependent variable is the 
recommended prison sentence in months, Months of Incarceration. The third dependent 
variable is Rehabilitation, a categorical value that represents how much the individual 
agrees or disagrees with the proposal of a rehabilitation program for prisoners. The first 
set of control variables includes just gender, age, and a dummy for growing up in 
America. The extended set of controls includes all the rest of pre-treatment questions 
available in the online survey, including a dummy for completion of the survey on the 
same day it was released (perhaps those who were more conscientious might also be 
more conservative in their attitudes toward crime; but see Table 8 for mean difference 
tests across pre-treatment variables). For the dependent variable Prison, we estimate a 
logit model and then report the marginal effects at the mean of the control variables. For 
Months of Incarceration we report OLS coefficients. For Rehabilitation we use the 
ordered logit model and we present the marginal effect on the probability of the highest 
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outcome (“Strongly Agree”) at the mean of control variables. We always report 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
The regression results are presented in Table 9. The treatment had an economically 
and statistically significant effect on all the dependent variables: relative to Jones Town, 
being in the group Cherry Gardens increases the probability of recommending a prison 
sentence by more than 15 percentage points, it increases the desired incarceration rate by 
approximately two months, and it decreases the probability of strongly agreeing with the 
implementation of the rehabilitation program by 15 percentage points. 





   Prison 
 
Months of Incarceration 
 
Rehabilitation 
Dependent Variable:  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
     
Cherry Gardens   0.124  0.154*  0.190** 
 
1.860*  1.940*  2.135* 
 
-
0.128*  -0.154**  -0.157** 
   -0.086  -0.087  -0.092 
 
-1.101  -1.111  -1.16 
 
-0.075  -0.075  -0.076 
  
                   
  
Basic Controls  No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
Extended Controls  No  No  Yes 
 
No  No  Yes 
 
No  No  Yes 
  
                   
  
Observations  127  127  127     127  127  127     128  128  128 
NOTES: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The coefficients for Prison are the marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables for a logit model. The coefficients for 
Months of Incarceration are OLS coefficients. The coefficients for Rehabilitation are the marginal effects on the probability of 
reporting the highest category, “Strongly agree,” at the mean of the independent variables using an ordered logit model. The basic 
set of controls includes gender, age and a dummy for growing up in America. The extended set of controls includes Never Married, 
Number of Children, Relative Income, Stay in America, and Monday. See Table 6 for data definitions and Table 7 for descriptive 
statistics. 
SOURCE: Data from the online experiment survey. 
 ￿￿￿
￿
We interpret this experimental evidence as supportive of the hypothesis that beliefs cause 
punishment. We should note that it has limited value, however, as a means to identify the 
particular channels highlighted in our model, as these are much more specific. And, of 
course, strong causal inferences are not feasible with such a small-scale exercise (for 
example, although the two scenarios involve burglars with similar criminal history who 
are caught stealing the same thing — a TV — a longer survey might be able to develop a 
better control for income). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Incarceration in the United States is the highest it has ever been and it is the highest in 
the world. What is the reason for this? Given that incarceration affects minorities 
disproportionately, it is easy to see racism as the basic cause (see, for example, Bonczar 
and Beck 1997). One problem with racism as a cause is that few people who support 
increases in punitiveness consider themselves racist. Thus, one restriction that we impose 
on candidate answers is that people accept their own theories (explaining their support for 
increases in punitiveness). Our answer is based on beliefs: we argue that the increase in 
punitiveness is associated with widespread belief in economic opportunities for those 
willing to put in the effort. Our explanation connects incarceration and differences in pay 
(and inequality), as argued by Western (2006), although in our model both are caused by 
beliefs about economic opportunities. In brief, we argue that harsh punishment is caused 
by the American dream.  
The paper describes selective facts related to the evolution of punishment in the 
United States over the period 1980–2004. We note that imprisonment started increasing 
around 1980, a period that coincides with the “Reagan revolution.” A large part of the 
increase involves expansion of the use of minimum-security prisons. While minorities are 
imprisoned at a disproportionate rate, the ratio of the incarceration rates for blacks versus 
whites has not changed even as these rates increased substantially. The contrast with the 
European experience, where imprisonment rates are much lower, suggests that 
differences in beliefs and ideologies could play a big role, as suggested by Tonry (1998).  
We then build an economic model where beliefs about economic opportunities and 
beliefs about punishment are correlated. There is a “French equilibrium,” where workers 
believe effort does not pay, firms set up bureaucratic systems (low-powered incentive 
schemes), and where criminals on average are “kinder.” There is an “American ￿￿￿
￿
equilibrium” where workers believe effort pays (and exert effort), firms set up a market 
technology (high-powered incentive schemes), and the proportion of mean types who 
become criminals is larger than in the French equilibrium. With increases in income, one 
can observe that there is a demand for harsher punishment. We present three pieces of 
evidence (across countries, across states in the United States, and an experimental 
exercise) that are consistent with the model. 
 
5. APPENDIX: EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL 
In this section we present an extension of the model of Section 2. The idea is to 
sketch how several interesting questions concerning crime can be incorporated into the 
model and therefore illustrate what the beliefs–punitiveness connection has to say about 
those questions. 
The first simple extension of the model we consider is incorporating “opportunities 
available to criminals” in the utility function of the government. In this modification, the 
government’s utility of a strategy ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ by the firm and t by the government, when 
beliefs about ￿ are given by h, is for a parameter x,  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ =>￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!6 
In the above equation O(s) represents the opportunities available to individuals when 
the firm chooses s. A natural definition of opportunities is >￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, the 
difference in income between choosing high and low effort. Similarly, >￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.  
In order to understand why incorporating opportunities in the utility function of the 
government is interesting, consider the following situation: The firm had chosen a market 
technology, a criminal was caught, and we know both his type ￿, and that he is a ￿￿who 
chose ￿￿. It seems natural that individuals (or the government) would want to set a 
harsher punishment if they knew that ￿￿ was high so that, by exerting effort, he could 
have avoided becoming a criminal. One possible reason for this harsher desired 
punishment is “identity”: people want to believe that they are not the kind of people who 
can be “fooled” or “taken advantage of”; they are probably willing to forgive a theft from 
somebody who had no opportunities, but they wouldn’t forgive a thief who could have ￿￿￿
￿
made an honest living but is taking advantage of their forgiveness. The formulation above 
captures the idea that when there are more opportunities — a larger O(s) — the 
government chooses a harsher punishment: the desired punishment is given by ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿?￿ ￿ =>￿￿￿!. 
In the above formulation, we have postulated that O(s) is calculated from the model. 
But one can also interpret O(s) as the “ideology” of the government, make it an 
exogenous parameter, and calibrate it from external data (say, opinion polls of officials) 
and note that increases in O(s) lead to increases in punishment. 
A second addition one can make to the model is: 
·  making returns to effort depend on the individual’s type; 
·  include a choice of one of two neighborhoods; at the time of choosing effort, the 
individual picks a rule that specifies a choice of neighborhood conditional on 
realized income. 
In this variation, the types would be irrelevant regarding the cost of effort (say, setting 
￿L = ￿H) but making the return to each effort random and dependent on the type. Also, 
and just to simplify, the choice of neighborhood would be made so as to minimize the 
distance between one’s expected income and the neighborhood’s average income.  
This extension can be used to address the important issue of the criminal behavior of 
African Americans and the harsh punishment they face. At least two different 
explanations for the harsh punishment arise in this model. The first (which does not use 
the neighborhood choice feature) is that the government holds a belief that criminals 
(regardless of their race) face very good opportunities in the legal market and therefore 
should be punished harshly.
24  
A second explanation is rooted on the intriguing observation that acquiring skills 
(e.g., obtaining a university degree) may be more profitable for poor African Americans 
than for whites, but that they are less prone to doing so than their white counterparts. That 
is, some data suggest that although African Americans earn less than whites in either 
category, the wage increase of obtaining a degree is larger for African Americans. In this 
model, the government punishes harshly because opportunities are in fact large. And one 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
24 This prediction runs in the opposite direction of models based on deterrence: the better the opportunities 
in the legal market, the less one has to punish criminals to deter them. ￿￿￿
￿
could obtain the result that African Americans are less prone to acquiring a degree and 
therefore more likely to engage in criminal behavior, through one of two methods.  
In one variation of the model, individuals have a belief about the return to each effort 
level and choose an effort level and a neighborhood rule (what neighborhood to choose, 
depending on the income); the beliefs about the return to each effort level must be 
consistent with the distribution of effort levels and incomes in the neighborhood he 
settles on. The story told by this version of the model is that individuals living in poor 
neighborhoods incorrectly estimate the returns to schooling because they only get to meet 
the lower tail of college-graduate wage earners (those who returned to the poor 
neighborhood).  
In order to sketch the second variation, imagine that the distribution of wages for 
college graduates is either $1 for sure, or $1 with probability 95 percent and $100 with 
probability 5 percent. The prior belief of the individual is that each distribution has the 
same probability. In order to estimate the returns to schooling, the individual samples a 
few people, but since sampling a graduate who earns $1 is so likely, the individual is 
likely to finish his sampling with a (downwardly) biased estimate of the returns to 
schooling. In fact, if the individual samples only once, with a probability of 97.5 percent, 
he will estimate that the distribution “degenerate at $1” is the most likely. One can 
incorporate this idea (developed in Benoît and Dubra 2011) into this model (without the 
need of biased sampling or neighborhood choices) to obtain the same predictions as in the 
previous paragraph. 
   ￿￿￿
￿
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